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This article discusses the development of European-Mediterranean relations, 
and EU policies towards the Israel-Palestine conflict in particular, in the con-
text of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM). The article considers the ENP and UfM as building 
stones in a foreign policy regime on behalf of the EU. The idea of analyzing 
EU policies as a regime is inspired by Roland Dannreuther, who in an article 
in 2007, quoting Stephen D. Krasner, suggested that EU’s greater Middle East 
strategy could best be defined as one of regime building, where the purpose 
of the regime is to ‚define rules, norms, principles and procedures that focus 
expectations regarding international behavior‛. In this article the point is 
taken further, discussing the newest organizational expressions of foreign 
policy ambitions on behalf of the EU, the ENP and the UfM, as the develop-
ment of a new regime, which can be perceived as a step towards developing a 
specific EU ‚agency‛ that would add new dimensions to the discussions 
about the character of the EU as to its foreign and security policy. 
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       he article will take its point of departure in earlier attempts at discussing the EU as 
a foreign policy actor, which over the last decades have resulted in a huge number of 
different perceptions – from François Duchêne and his understanding of European 
civilian power domesticating the European surroundings to Federica Bicchi’s concept 
of ideational intergovernmentalism and her understanding that the EU still needs to 
offer a less Europe-centered contribution to Mediterranean politics.1 It is not the idea 
(and hardly possible) within the framework of this article to cover the complete range 
of theories and perceptions of the EU as a foreign policy actor. The intention of this 
article is to shed light, based on predominant interpretations of the EU as foreign pol-
icy actor, on recent developments of EU policies towards the Middle East with a spe-
cial focus on the Israel-Palestine question. Taking this conflict-ridden dimension of the 
Middle East as point of departure it is furthermore the ambition to discuss possible 
future scenarios for the EU on the international political scene. 
The recent ENP Progress Report on the occupied Palestinian territory is rather 
precise in its characterization of the difficult situation regarding the relationship be-
tween Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the overall problematic situation 
in the West Bank and Gaza. The report mentions that although Israel has relaxed some 
restrictions in the West Bank, other Israeli actions in the West Bank continue to under-
mine the PA, hampering its capacity to implement reforms as well as the prospects for 
economic development.2 It furthermore emphasizes the negative consequences of the 
continued Israeli siege of Gaza. Despite the obvious problems the report claims that 
‚The PA has made increasing use of the ENP as a means of underpinning its state-
building activities and consolidating the PA’s political position on its future interna-
tional status‛3. This exaggerated formulation covers at the same time a de facto stand-
still in the actual political development in the occupied Palestinian territories and in 
the implementation of the ENP Action Plan.  
The development of the UfM since its launching in the summer of 2008 is re-
flected in the European Union External Action homepage: ‚The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, formerly known as the Barcelona Process, was re-launched in 2008 as the 
                                                          
1 Bicchi, F. (2007). European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean. New York; Ba-
singstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.(191) Duchêne, F. and C. o. t. E. Communities (1984). The Euro-
pean Community and the Mediterranean basin: study on the consequences of the process of 
enlargement both for the Mediterranean zone and for the Community itself and the conditions 
necessary for the definition of a global and forward-looking policy of the Community towards 
the Mediterranean basin. Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Com-
munites; European Community Information Service [distributor].  
2 Progress Report on the occupied Palestinian territory. EU-Commission (2010) 
3 Ibid. p. 2. 
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Union for the Mediterranean at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean. (<) This re-
launching aimed to infuse a new vitality into the Partnership and to raise the political 
level of the strategic relationship between the EU and its southern neighbours. While 
maintaining the acquits of its predecessor, the Barcelona Process, the Union for the 
Mediterranean offers more balanced governance, increased visibility to its citizens and 
a commitment to tangible, regional and trans-national projects.‛4 
In reality, however, not much vitality has been infused into the renamed ‚Part-
nership‛, and the ‚tangible, regional and trans-national projects‛ are rather than real-
ized visions for balanced governance and European visibility still mere suggestions for 
future cooperation. The limited development regarding the six projects described as 
the central activities in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the postponement of 
several summit meetings and the many controversies between Arab and Israeli mem-
bers since the launching of the UfM in 2008 have clearly demonstrated that the grand 
ambitions of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy have not been realized. Rather it 
seems that much more moderate perspectives unfold which point in directions I have 
tried to describe and analyze in two recent articles, where it has been my intention to 
discuss pragmatic and depoliticizing elements inherent in the bilaterally organized 
ENP and what I call the pragmatic multilateralism and depoliticization of the UfM.5  
The EU’s invention of the Mediterranean – and the Israel-Palestine question 
According to Federica Bicchi, the EU invented the Mediterranean in the beginning of 
the 1970s. The ‚endeavor was accomplished by putting forward a foreign policy initia-
tive aimed at Mediterranean nonmember countries, under the name of the ’Global 
Mediterranean Policy’ (GMP).‛6 Bicchi describes further on, how the GMP was sup-
plemented by the so-called Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD), which was launched in the 
1970s and in the beginning was based on French Middle East policy. The idea of the 
EAD, as it was thought of back in the 1970s was that it should ‚explore the ways and 
means of establishing an interregional partnership‛, as described in a contemporary 
                                                          
4 See European Union External Action homepage. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
5 Seeberg, P. (2010). "European Neighbourhood Policy, post-normativity and pragmatism." Eu-
ropean Foreign Affairs Review 15(Special Issue), Seeberg, P. (2010). "Union for the Mediterra-
nean – pragmatic multilateralism and the de-politicization of European-Middle Eastern rela-
tions." Middle East Critique 19(3): 287-302. 
6 Bicchi, F. (2007). European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean. New York; Ba-
singstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.(63) 
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article by Alan R. Taylor.7 The EAD emerged after the 1973 October war and expressed 
a perception of the Israeli-Arab conflict in which the Europeans affirmed their com-
mitment to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East building on the legitimate rights 
of the Palestinians. 
In the 1970s, the Europeans were not autonomous in their relations to the Middle 
East conflict. They were dependent on the US, especially during the period when 
Henry Kissinger was secretary of state. The EC-states had promised him to keep poli-
tics out of the EAD. But gradually a realization came to the fore, on behalf of the Euro-
peans, that they were able to develop an independent attitude towards the Arab states 
– and that they had other interests in the global arena than the US, one of them being 
Mediterranean affairs.8 An important reason for this was related to security issues – in 
two rather different manners. The first aspect had to do with economic relations and 
the turbulences which culminated under the Yom Kippur War in 1973. In 1972, the 
price of crude oil was about $3.00 per barrel; by the end of 1974, the price had quadru-
pled to over $12.00. OPEC boycott threats left Europe vulnerable, and the oil shock 
turned access to oil into an issue of national security.9 
The second aspect had to do with terror related to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. 
The Palestinian guerrillas deliberately decided to shift their strategy in order to bring 
their fight closer to the Europeans. And in this period terrorism gradually became an 
important issue for the European perception of the Middle East. Bicchi makes the point 
that the years between 1968 and 1974 as regards terror can be divided in three stages, 
where the first stage mostly had Israeli targets and only marginally affected the Euro-
peans. The second stage started in 1970, where the Arab-Palestinian terrorists entered 
the international political scene – and in the Middle East led to ‚Black September‛. The 
third stage was focusing on attacks inside Europe and led to a situation, where terror-
ism became a European security issue.10 
Therefore, despite the fact that terrorism in the beginning of the 1970s belonged 
to what might be described as a low security issue, international terrorism certainly 
contributed to changes in European policies towards the Mediterranean, not the least 
                                                          
7 Taylor, A. R. (1978). "Euro-Arab Dialogue: Quest for an Interregional Partnership." Middle 
East Journal 32(4): 429-443. (429) See also Youngs, R. (2003). "European Approaches to Security 
in the Mediterranean." Middle East Journal 57(3): 414-431. 
8 Taylor, A. R. (1978). "Euro-Arab Dialogue: Quest for an Interregional Partnership." Middle 
East Journal 32(4): 429-443. 
9 See Bretherton, C. and J. Vogler (1999). The European Union as a Global Actor. London, Rout-
ledge. See also Bicchi, F. (2007). European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean. 
New York; Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.(65) 
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because it, in its effects, were part of the East-West confrontation, in the sense that 
many of the terror groups ideologically belonged to the anti-Western side in the Cold 
War.11 The Europeans were on their way to realizing that something had to be done in 
order to deal with the southern neighbours. In the long run threats to the oil supply 
from the Middle East and the unstable situation relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
therefore, with the establishment of the EAD in 1974, led to attempts at constructing a 
new European policy vis-à-vis the Middle East. Historical relations between the French 
and the Arabs (in the Levant especially related to Lebanon and Syria) further encour-
aged attempts at improving relations to the Arab states and the Palestinians. 
The enlargement of the EC in January 1973 (Denmark, Ireland and the UK) con-
tributed further to this tendency – first of all because of a stronger British influence on 
European politics. The Venice Declaration in 1980 can be seen as result of combined 
(though not yet coordinated) French and British efforts at pursuing European interests 
in the Middle East based on traditional French and British foreign policies towards the 
contradictions in the Levant. The fact that the efforts were not coordinated can to some 
degree be blamed on French interests in adhering to their own national policy in the 
Levant. The important reality, however, is that both France and the UK played an ac-
tive role in drawing up the declaration, and that both, to some extent, claimed to be the 
main architect behind it.12 
The Venice Declaration never became a success. What it suggested was never re-
alized. The most interesting feature related to the Venice Declaration was maybe that it 
could be interpreted as a substantial attempt at creating a common European foreign 
policy: ‚if the Venice Declaration was a landmark in the development of European 
cooperation in foreign policy, it soon fell short of expectations as follow-on documents 
and missions sent to the area failed to accomplish any of their substantial aims.‛13 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10 Bicchi, F. (2007). European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean. New York; 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.  
11 Both aspects are confirmed by the then British Secretary of State, Douglas Hurd, who in an 
interview with the author, states: ‚Well, of course the disappearance of the Cold War changed 
because we were no longer thinking of the Middle East as a sort of possible playground for the 
Soviet Union, I mean its ambitions sort of  faded. But we were not yet in the mode we are in 
now where we worry about extremists< America’s call to war on terror is now the dominant 
thing. So there is a gap in between 1989 and 2001 when there wasn’t an overwhelming security 
preoccupation.‛ 
12 This was claimed in interviews with the author with the then French Foreign Minister Hubert 
Vedrine and the then British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. 
13 Bicchi is here referring to a renowned article by Adam Garfinkle in which  he discusses an 
early tendency at convergence between the US and the EU, see Bicchi, F. (2007). European For-
eign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean. New York; Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmil-
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The Venice Declaration provoked strong Israeli criticism. 14 Israeli politicians and 
the media in Israel claimed that Europe was both pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian, first of 
all because of the statements about Palestinian right to self-determination: ‚A just solu-
tion must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refu-
gees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a 
position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehen-
sive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination.‛15 The Israeli 
Cabinet issued a statement comparing the PLO to Adolf Hitler, and making it clear that 
the Declaration was far from what should be expected from a Europe as the historical 
site of the Holocaust. Israel, it was implied, could not rely on the Europeans: ‚Israel 
does not seek a guarantee for its security from any European nation. Israel knows, and 
will know, how to defend itself.‛ 16 
From its beginnings, the relation between the EC (and later the EU) and Israel has 
been a controversial issue in the Israel public. The ENP and, in connection with that, 
the Action Plan for Israel, might be the first rather successful attempt at bridging this 
gap between the Europeans and Israel as to cooperation beyond ordinary trade and 
cooperation in international organizations. It might be perceived as a moderate suc-
cess, as discussed by Rafaella A del Sarto, in the sense that progress has been made as 
shown later in this article.17 The question, however, remains if the rather concrete and 
practical matters addressed in the plan could provide the basis for mutual understand-
ing. Does the ENP provide a framework that could bridge differences between the EU 
                                                                                                                                                                          
lan.(116) For an analysis of recent contradictions between the European main powers, see See-
berg, P. (2009). European security and the 'clash of civilisations'. Differences in the policies of 
France, Germany and the UK towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East? Clash or Coop-
eration of Civilisations - Overlapping Integration and Identities. W. Zank. London, Ashgate: 
147-166. 
14 See for instance de la Gorce, P.-M. (1997). "Europe and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Survey." 
Journal of Palestine Studies 26(3): 5-16. Smith, P. A. (1882). "The European Reaction to Israel's 
Invasion." Journal of Palestine Journal 11/12(4 + 1): 38-47, Soetendorp, B. (2002). "The EU's In-
volvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Building of a Visible International Iden-
tity." European Foreign Affairs Review 7(3): 283-95. 
15 Declaration of the Venice Summit, EC, June 1980.  
16 It was implied from the Israeli side that the Europeans were being motivated by their interest 
in guaranteeing stable oil supplies from the Arab States; in addition, it stated that ‚Nothing will 
remain of the Venice Resolution but its bitter memory. The Resolution calls upon us, and other 
nations, to include in the peace process the Arab S.S. known as "The Palestine Liberation Organ-
ization." Houk, M. (2009). "A New Convergence? European and American Positions on Jerusa-
lem." Jerusalem Quarterly 39: 88-96. 
17 Del Sarto, R. A. (2007). "Wording and Meaning (s): EU-Israeli Political Cooperation according 
to the ENP Action Plan." Mediterranean Politics 12(1): 59-75. 
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and Israel, thereby demonstrating another pragmatic aspect of the ENP – this time hav-
ing to do with a relatively well-functioning development of economic relations be-
tween the two partners. 
The EU Mediterranean policies as a regime 
Before discussing the relevance of the notion of a regime it would be necessary to dis-
cuss how EU international governance can be understood. As pointed out at the begin-
ning, there has been an ongoing discussion almost since the launching of the EC as to 
the character of this new entity on the international political scene. Tobias Schumacher 
has drawn up a useful outline over the main positions, briefly pointing to the different 
perceptions of the EU (or the future EU) in research: a civilian power, a superpower, an 
international state, an imperfect international actor etc.18 James Caporaso points in a 
famous article from 1996 at how the EU develops its institutions and examines the EU 
in the light of three state forms – the Westphalian state, the regulatory state and the 
post-modern state,19 and discusses how the study of the EU is ‚moving into a post-
ontological stage; scholars are less concerned with how to categorize than how to ex-
plain process and outcome, paying less attention to ‘the nature of the beast’.‛20 
The aim of this article is not to get involved in this discussion. Instead, it is first of 
all meant to note that the development of the EU as foreign policy actor is character-
ized by what Michael E. Smith calls ‚unfinished business‛. By this he highlights a lack 
of institutional development, an absence of internal coherence and a lack of efficiency 
in external relations.21 Furthermore it is the idea to point at changes in EU ‚actorness‛ 
by looking at the process related to the ENP and the UfM and how they are construct-
ing a new institutional setup, which represents a new level of Euro-Mediterranean co-
operation, but still shaped by Europeanization rather than shared ownership – this 
both being the case for the ENP and the UfM. There are obvious differences between 
the ENP and the UfM regarding the question of ownership, but it is part of the ideo-
logical setting for both policy-complexes that a commonality of interests between both 
sides of the Mediterranean is taken for granted. In the case of the ENP, this under-
standing is expressed in the concept of ‚a ring of friends‛ as the underlying discursive 
framework, and in the fact that the Action Plans in principle are results of negotiations 
                                                          
18 Schumacher, T. (2005). Die Europäische Union als internationaler Akteur im südlichen Mit-
telmeerraum : "Actor Capability" und EU-Mittelmeerpolitik. Baden-Baden, Nomos.(41) 
19 Caporaso, J. A. (1996). "The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or 
Post-Modern." Journal of Common Market Studies 34(1): 29-52. 
20 Ibid., p. 30 
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between bilateral partners. In the context of the UfM, the claim of co-ownership is for-
mally institutionalized, for instance, in the dual presidency and the biannual summit 
meetings. 
In the following I will argue that the combination of the ENP and the UfM tends 
to reinforce the pragmatic dimension of EU foreign policy. The two strategic policies 
are constructing what I suggest can be termed an EU foreign policy regime. In 
Dannreuther’s attempt at discussing EU foreign policy as an expression of regime-
building he links his analysis to the so-called greater Middle East. He claims that the 
‚particular ‘Middle East regime’ which Europe seeks to develop is one where interna-
tional behavior, including most notably that of the US, converges on the need for a 
multilateral and institutionalized approach‛ and that such a regime ‛must be the core 
foundation block for breeding the mutual respect and trust in the Middle East required 
for a long-lasting peace and prosperity.‛22 
My suggestion is to utilize the regime-concept for a slightly different purpose, 
namely to propose a new concept for understanding the EU foreign policy practice, 
where political pragmatism is tied up with the idea of a regime, thereby pointing to a 
certain coherence and consistency between the ENP and the UfM. The idea of applying 
the concept of regime to foreign policy analysis is often related to Stephen Krasner, 
who develops this in his influential work ‚International Regimes‛.23 In Krasner’s well-
known definition a regime is defined as ‚implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations.‛24 Krasner defines furthermore the concepts of 
principles, norms and rules and adds that ‚Decision-making procedures are prevailing 
practices for making and implementing collective choice.‛25 
I emphasize the last part of the definition here, because it is relevant in the case of 
the EU. The EU is making collective choices – in a political framework where (espe-
                                                                                                                                                                          
21 Schmidt, M. (2004). Europe's Foreign and Security Policy. The Institutionalization of Coopera-
tion. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.(p. 209ff) 
22 Dannreuther, R. (2007). Recasting the Barcelona Process: Europe and the Middle East. EU and 
the Mediterranean. Foreign Policy and Security. P. Seeberg. Odense, University Press of South-
ern Denmark.(52) 
23 The classical work here is Krasner, S. D. e. (1983). International Regimes. Ithaca, Cornell Uni-
versity Press. See also Krasner, S. (1995). Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights. Regime 
Theory and International Relations. R. e. al. Oxford, Clarendon Press, Hasenclever, A., Peter 
Mayer & Volker Rittberger (1997). Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, Rittberger, V. (1997). Regime Theory and International Relations. Oxford, Cla-
rendon. 
24 Krasner, S. D. e. (1983). International Regimes. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 
25 Ibid. 
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cially some of) the individual member states insist on pursuing their own foreign pol-
icy agendas besides the ‚collective choices‛. The concept of regime has often been ap-
plied to discussions about the EU as a security regime.26 The relation between the ENP 
and the EU enlargement process is part of the background for this, as it is explained by 
Florent Parmentier: ‚<the ENP is a process of norms diffusion in the European ‘near 
abroad’, largely influenced by the EU’s security concerns and realized under the con-
straints of the ‘enlargement fatigue’.‛27 
It is certainly a reality that the EU policies since 9.11 and the tragedies of Madrid 
and London in 2004 and 2005, respectively, have resulted in a much more explicit focus 
on security than was the case before the year 2001.28 The policies established after 2001 
reflect this reality. The ENP by being a realist and pragmatic based policy yet in a nor-
mative rhetoric, the UfM by being launched without the normative wording but with a 
focus on noncontroversial projects designed to create progress and development with-
out changing political relations. It can therefore be concluded that from the ENP to the 
UfM there is a not only continuity in the real practices – there is even a de facto identity 
when it comes to the actual implementation. 
EU ENP and UfM policies towards the PA and Israel 
 
The ENP, the PA and Israel 
This section will describe and compare the ENP and the UfM in relation to Israel and 
the PA. As presented in the European Commission External cooperation programmes 
concerning the occupied Palestinian territory the EU has since the launching of the 
Barcelona process in 1995 considered the PA as a full and equal partner in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).29 An Association Agreement was signed in 1997 and 
it is mentioned that since the outbreak of the second intifada the implementation of the 
Interim Association Agreement has become more and more difficult.  
                                                          
26 Des Places, S. B. and H. Oger (2004). "Making the European regime: Decoding Member States 
Legal Strategies." European Journal of Migration & Law 6(4): 353-379, Charillon, F. (2005). "The 
EU as a Security Regime." European Foreign Affairs Review 10(4): 517-533. 
27 Parmentier, F. (2008). The reception of EU neighbourhood policy. EU foreign Policy in a Glo-
balized World. Normative power and social preferences. Z. Laïdi. Abingdon, Routledge. 
28 This is confirmed in interviews by the author with contemporary European decision makers, 
among them Jean Francois Poncét (France), Lord Carrington (UK), Mark Eyskens (Belgium) and 
Per Stig Møller (Denmark). 
29 See the relevant EU-homepage here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-
cooperation/occupied_palestinian_territory/occupied-palestinian-territory_en.htm. 
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According to Isabel Schäfer the EMP-related documents and activities regarding 
the PA can be seen as a continuation of the Venice Declaration in the sense that by in-
tegrating the Palestinian Territories into the institutional mechanism of the EMP and 
supporting the creation of the PA in 1996, ‚the EU diplomatically upgraded the Pales-
tinian Territories to the status of a quasi-state, sending a political message to Israel and 
the international community.‛30 It can be discussed to which degree it was a deliberate 
intention to send a message to Israel; but taking the optimism after the adoption of the 
Declaration of Principles in September 1993 into consideration, it is understandable 
why the EU acted in this way in the middle of the 1990s.31 
In spite of the many difficulties after the start of the second Intifada, it seems that 
this practice of treating the PA as an entity similar to a state was continued also after 
the launching of the ENP. In 2004 the PA was included into the first round of partner 
countries in the ENP. As described in the EU homepage the EU-Commission prepared 
a Country Report (published May 2004) analyzing the overall situation in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.32 One year later, in May 2005, the EU and the PA agreed on an 
ENP Action Plan setting out the jointly agreed priorities. 
The two Action Plans for the PA and Israel are in several ways different. Whereas 
the EU/Israel Action Plan is 24 pages long, relatively detailed and elaborate in its word-
ing, the EU/PA Action Plan is 11 pages long, less detailed and less elaborate. In the case 
of Israel – as in the cases of several other states including Jordan and Lebanon – the 
Action Plan is introduced with the following statement: ‚The EU and Israel are now 
closer together than ever before and, as near neighbours, will reinforce their political 
and economic interdependence‛. In the case of the PA, however, this vision is de-
scribed as a project, not as an already achieved reality; the introduction says: ‚The EU 
and the Palestinian Authority, as close neighbours, will reinforce their political and 
economic interdependence.‛33 The Action Plan for the PA is very sketchy, not the least 
                                                          
30 Schäfer, I. (2009). The European Reform Agenda for Palestine: Democratizing a Polity or Mar-
ginalising Political Actors. Democracy Building and Democratic Erosion. Political Change 
North and South of the Mediterranean. E. Kienle. London, Saqi., p. 116. See also an earlier ar-
ticle by Schäfer, where she besides the Israel-Palestine issue also includes the Iraq-war in an 
assessment of the EMP in a Middle Eastern context: Schäfer, I. I., Ferhad (2005). Regional Crises 
and Europe: How the Middle East Conflict and Iraq War Affect the EMP. EuroMeSCopaper, 
EuroMeSCo: 1-20. 
31 I discuss this in Seeberg, P. (2007). "Unity in Diversity", security and migration. The Changing 
European Foreign Policy and Security Agenda in the Mediterranean. EU and the Mediterra-
nean. Foreign Policy and Security. P. Seeberg. Odense, University Press of Southern Denmark. 
32 See footnote 22. 
33 Both Action Plans can be found at the European Commission European Neighbourhood Poli-
cy homepage, with this url: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm. 
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in the sections dealing with political progress. The positive conditionality built into the 
ENP is emphasized in the Introduction, where it is stated that implementing the Action 
Plan ‚will significantly advance the approximation of Palestinian legislation, norms 
and standards to those of the European Union.  
As indicated in the two latest (2008 and 2009) Progress Reports on the occupied 
Palestinian territory, the year 2008 saw some progress in several of the areas covered 
by the ENP action plan, yet these developments ended in a tragedy. The Israeli opera-
tion ‚Cast Lead‛, which was launched 27 December 2008 and lasted until 17 January 
2009, developed into a full scale war: ‚Reportedly over 1315 Palestinians were killed, of 
which 415 were children and 110 women, and over 5.500 wounded.‛34 Schäfer men-
tions that the EU/PA Action Plan was suspended in 2006 by the EU, following the es-
tablishment of the coalition government in the occupied territories.35 In an attempt to 
make the EU aid-programmes work, new programmes were launched from 2006, first 
the so-called Temporary International Mechanism (TIM), later on PEGASE.36 As Are 
Hovdenak explains the EU decided to ‚join the rest of the Quartet (The UN, the US and 
Russia) in boycotting the Hamas government in order to force it to comply with three 
demands: recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, and acceptance of past Israeli-
Palestinian agreements.‛37  
Schäfer makes the point that the ENP is at least partly influenced by the Kantian 
theory of democratic peace: The EU hopes to foster a ‚Ring of Friends‛ meaning a belt 
of democracies surrounding the 27 European partners. This attempt at creating a secu-
rity environment is then combined with the promotion of European norms, standards 
and ‘shared values’; altogether, according to Schäfer, a prime example of the growing 
role of the EU as a normative power.38 Contrary to this perception of the EU policies it 
might be claimed that the EU is doing something else, namely avoiding raising de-
mands at its partners in the ENP and instead pursuing a realist, pragmatic policy 
where the norms and standards are hidden behind discretionary language and an ab-
                                                          
34 EU-Commission (2010). Progress Report on the occupied Palestinian territory. Brussels. 
35 Schäfer, I. (2009). The European Reform Agenda for Palestine: Democratizing a Polity or Mar-
ginalising Political Actors. Democracy Building and Democratic Erosion. Political Change 
North and South of the Mediterranean. E. Kienle. London, Saqi. 
36 TIM and PEGASE – should be described< 
37 Hovdenak, A. (2009). "Hamas in transition: the failure of sanctions." Democratization 16(1): 
59-80.(60) 
38 Schäfer, I. (2009). The European Reform Agenda for Palestine: Democratizing a Polity or Mar-
ginalising Political Actors. Democracy Building and Democratic Erosion. Political Change 
North and South of the Mediterranean. E. Kienle. London, Saqi. 
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sence of insisting on values constitutive for the EU,39 which in a longer perspective 
might be problematic, as discussed by for instance Bassma Kodmani.40 Kodmani dis-
cusses to which degree aid from the West can be used for putting pressure on the au-
thoritarian states and claims that this in some cases might be a clever strategy: ‚If the 
US and Europe took a clear, public and consistent stance against undemocratic prac-
tices, then the governments would understand better the price they might have to pay 
for failing to take heed, and the social movements that are demanding democracy 
would be encouraged.‛41                 
The discussion related to the PA and its status as a partner in the implementation 
of an EU-PA Action Plan has important regional dimensions in the sense that interven-
tions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from other parts of the region influence the 
overall security environment and the way both the PA and other Middle Eastern states 
are perceived in Europe. Support from Iran and Syria for Hamas will, other things be-
ing equal, contribute to a European reluctance to approach the Hamas as an important 
non-state actor in the Middle East. And support from Hezbollah to Hamas and the al-
leged support from Al Qaida to radical groups in Gaza and the West Bank adds to this 
reluctance. In a way the European call for democratic elections in the Palestinian terri-
tories can be seen as representing a denial of European long term political practices in 
the Middle East where stability has been prioritized over democracy – not least due to 
the geographic proximity of the Arab world to European borders.  
In the Arab world substantial support for the PA and the creation of a Palestinian 
state is rather limited. The fact that only limited pressure is put on the PA as to its au-
thoritarian character from the Arab states is hardly surprising. But it is also a reality 
that the Arab neighbours to the PA have not – apart from rhetoric declarations of soli-
darity at for instance Arab League summits – made much effort promoting a Palestin-
ian state. As pointed at by Schäfer, a few exceptions can be mentioned: ‚the Arab Peace 
Initiative of 2002, and the mediation between Hamas and Fatah by the King of Saudi 
Arabia in February 2007, which helped to conclude the Mecca Agreement and to form 
the short-lived Palestinian unity government.‛42 As mentioned by Schäfer the Arab 
                                                          
39 Seeberg, P. (2009). "The EU as a realist actor in normative clothes: EU democracy promotion in 
Lebanon and the European Neighbourhood Policy." Democratization 16(1): 81-99. 
40 Kodmani, B. (2010). Democratization by whom? Resistance to democracy promotion in the 
Middle East. New Challenges to Democratization. P. Burnell and R. Youngs. Abingdon, Rout-
ledge. 
41 Ibid., p. 169. 
42 Schäfer, I. (2009). The European Reform Agenda for Palestine: Democratizing a Polity or Mar-
ginalising Political Actors. Democracy Building and Democratic Erosion. Political Change 
North and South of the Mediterranean. E. Kienle. London, Saqi. 
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Peace Initiative was reaffirmed in connection with the Riyad Arab League summit 
meeting in 2007 – the proposal including Hamas.  
The Egyptian attempts at mediating between Hamas and Fatah after the Israel-
Gaza war are mentioned in the EU-Commission Progress Report, but as described in 
the report the negotiations ‚yielded no results, partly due to external influences on the 
parties‛.43 The later years have seen growing contradictions among Arab states and 
also between some Arab states and strong non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah44. 
The above mentioned ‚external influences‛ are therefore important and for the EU 
probably decisive as the highly complex reality related to the PA obstructs the aims 
outlined in the Action Plan. Schäfer discusses how the ENP might in effect undermine 
efforts at establishing a Palestinian state, even though some progress has been achieved 
within Palestinian civil society and public, political debate. Still, she also emphasizes 
that Hamas bears a part of the responsibility for the problematic situation. They could 
have shown a willingness to refrain from violence and moderated its policies towards 
Israel. If this had been the case recognition by the international community might have 
contributed to avoiding the marginalization of Hamas, which had led to further inter-
nal conflicts in Palestinian society. 
The Action Plan for Israel was, as described by Rafaella A. del Sarto, concluded 
in December 2004 and adopted in spring 2005 – parallel to the Action Plan for the PA. 
Del Sarto makes the interesting point that the Action Plan is interpreted differently in 
Israel and in the EU, for instance (hardly surprising) regarding the question of a Pales-
tinian state.45 Del Sarto mentions that after entering the agreement, EU Commissioner 
for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2004) stressed that Israel had made 
commitments in writing which it had never before made with any other partner, for 
instance as to the viability of a future Palestinian state, in relation to counterterrorism 
activities and concerning WMD. Yet Del Sarto argues that ‚given the traditional diver-
gences between Brussels and Israel on the principles of political cooperation in general, 
and the EU’s role in Middle East politics in particular, a thorough analysis of the Ac-
tion Plan raises serious doubts on whether both sides actually agreed on the same is-
sues.‛46 
As such the ENP, rather than being an ambitious policy aiming at promoting EUs 
normative agenda in the Middle East, it seems that regarding Israel the ENP can be 
                                                          
43 EU-Commission (2010). Progress Report on the occupied Palestinian territory. Brussels.(p. 3) 
44 Valbjørn, M. and A. Bank (2007). "Signs of a New Arab Cold War: The 2006 Lebanon War and 
the Sunni-Shi‘i Divide." Middle East Report 242 (Spring): 6-11. 
45 Del Sarto, R. A. (2007). "Wording and Meaning (s): EU-Israeli Political Cooperation according 
to the ENP Action Plan." Mediterranean Politics 12(1): 59-75. 
46 Ibid., p. 60. 
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interpreted in a completely different way, namely as realism in normative clothes: 
‚Considering the divergent strategies and preferences of the EU and Israel regarding 
the future of bilateral relations, the Action Plan is in fact a real masterpiece of diplomacy 
(Italics added by del Sarto).‛47 This assessment is built on an understanding of the rela-
tions between Israel and the EU which on one side is aware of many years of Israeli 
criticism of the EU for being pro-Palestinian. On the other side, however, Israel is also 
by far the state in the Middle East which is closer to Europe, as mentioned in the Ac-
tion Plan: Israel’s ‚high level of economic development should enjoy special status in 
its relations with the EU on the basis of reciprocity and common interest.‛48 In reality it 
does; the ENP-agreements between the EU and Israel work better than any agreement 
entered between the EU and the Arab states. This, however, is not necessarily an indi-
cator of success.49 
 
The UfM, PA and Israel 
The contradictions between Israel and the Palestinians were part of the background for 
the historic meeting in Paris in July 2008, where 27 European and 16 non-European 
state leaders met in order to sign the Union for the Mediterranean Treaty – and cele-
brate the Bastille day in Sarkozy’s grand setup. It was something of a diplomatic 
achievement that the French president succeeded in bringing together most of the 
leaders from the invited states. Benyamin Netanyahu was there, together with both 
Mahmoud Abbas and Bashar al-Assad, and Sarkozy for instance succeeded in bringing 
Lebanon and Syria closer together after years of hostility. Apart from this promising 
start the institutional as well as the political development of the UfM has not contrib-
uted much to improvements in the relation between Israel and the Palestinians or be-
tween Israel and the Arabs.  
Rather the Arab-Israeli conflict has played an important role for the (lack of) po-
litical and institutional development of the UfM. Due to the Gaza crisis in the begin-
ning of 2009 UfM meetings scheduled between January and April 2009 were post-
poned. The election of Avigdor Lieberman as Minister of Foreign Affairs led to prob-
lems for the cooperation and in November 2009 to postponement of a planned UfM 
meeting at Foreign Minister level in Istanbul. As it was expressed in a document from 
the European Parliament: ‚the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers which was to have 
been held in Istanbul on November 24–25, 2009 has had to be postponed owing to a 
boycott by the Arab States, protesting against the Israeli position on the Middle East 
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peace process.‛50 Unofficially an Egyptian official failed to invite the Israeli minister 
because of Lieberman’s insulting earlier remarks made against the Egyptian President 
(who happens to be the co-president of the UfM). Lieberman told Mubarak to ‘go to 
hell,’ because Mubarak continued to refuse to visit Israel—leading to an official apol-
ogy by President Shimon Peres and former Foreign Minister Ehud Olmert.51 
In short, it becomes clear that the UfM to some degree is being held hostage by 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Eduard S. I. Lecha and Irene Garcia point out that forms of 
flexible multilateralism as foreseen in the UfM could contribute to bypass certain diffi-
culties. However, the reinforcement of political dialogue and the enhancement of the 
new institutional structure, especially the co-presidency, expose the UfM to the ups 
and downs of the Arab-Israeli conflict.52 According to Lecha and Garcia as a result of 
this situation it seems unlikely that the European-Mediterranean cooperation in the 
domain of the Arab-Israeli peace process is able to achieve any progress.  
On the other hand, the political and institutional set-up of the UfM can also be in-
terpreted as a design which is constructed in order to prevent entering sensitive politi-
cal issues. In this sense, it is meaningful to describe the UfM as a continuation of the 
pragmatic bilateralism which characterizes the ENP in its actual practice, but this time 
in a multilateral setting.53 At the institutional level it should be mentioned that both 
Israel and the PA were given a secretarial post in the newly established secretariat in 
Barcelona, while a Jordanian, Ahmad Khalaf Masa’deh, was appointed General Secre-
tary.54 The financing of the projects under the UfM will, according to the Joint Declara-
tion of the summit in Paris, July 2008, be provided through a different number of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
49 This is shown for Jordan and Lebanon in Seeberg, P. (2010). "European Neighbourhood Poli-
cy, post-normativity and pragmatism." European Foreign Affairs Review 15(Special Issue). 
50 See European Parliament (2009) Session document B7–0149/2009, p. 3. Available at 
http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef ¼ -//EP//NONSGML þ MOTION þ B7-2009-0149 þ 0 þ DOC 
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51 S. Ilan et al. (2009) Lieberman: Mubarak can ‘go to hell’; Peres, Olmert apologize, Haaretz, 
January 18. 
52 Lecha, E. S. i. and I. Garcia (2009). "The Union for the Mediterranean. What has it changed and 
what can be changed in the domain of security?" INEX Policy Brief 4/December 2009: 5. 
53 This is based on my article Seeberg, P. (2010). "Union for the Mediterranean – pragmatic mul-
tilateralism and the de-politicization of European-Middle Eastern relations." Middle East Criti-
que 19(3): 287-302. 
54 The six posts of Deputy Secretaries General have been assigned to three countries from the EU 
and three countries from the Southern Mediterranean countries. Of these Israel and the PA each 
has a post: Ilan Chet (Israel), responsable for the higher education and scientific research portfo-
lio and Rafiq al Husseini (Palestinian Authority), in charge of water and environmental issues.  
Peter Seeberg: Constructing a regime 
 
 
16 
sources, partly private donors and investors.55 It is so far unclear to which degree the 
projects under the UfM are financed or not – several of them are not really up and run-
ning yet. 
Summing up it seems that the ENP and the UfM together, as far as Israel and the 
PA are concerned, represent a development where only few goals have been reached. 
The EU/Israel ENP Action Plan is apparently working, as a result, as mentioned, of 
economic and societal reciprocity in a broad sense. This is not the case regarding the 
EU/PA Action Plan, in spite of the good intentions expressed in the rather sketchy 
plan. The contradictions between Hamas and Fatah are important in explaining the 
lack of progress related to the Action Plan but also the pragmatism on behalf of the EU. 
As mentioned the plans for Israel and the PA are different, and the policies of the EU 
reflect these differences, which again influence the progress reports and new agree-
ments being decided upon. 
The UfM has so far been characterized by little progress, partly due to the Israeli-
Arab conflict. As a result of Israel’s attacks on the Gaza Strip in December 2008-January 
2009, the Arab states refused to meet at high level, thus blocking all the ministerial 
meetings scheduled for the first half of 2009. The rejection among the Arab Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs to meet with their Israeli counterpart, Avigdor Lieberman, resulted in 
further postponements and cancellations. These developments have of course little to 
do with the organizational design of the UfM as such. It is an interesting paradox that a 
construction which is shaped in order to prevent entering sensitive political issues, and 
which can be seen as a continuation of the pragmatism characterizing the ENP in its 
actual practice, almost has become paralyzed by one of the most deeply rooted con-
flicts of the Middle East. 
Conclusion and perspectives 
This article contains in a way two parallel conclusions. On one side it is discussed to 
which degree the EU is pursuing a pragmatic policy towards the difficult political re-
alities in the Middle East, as claimed by for instance Eberhard Kienle: ‚In practice, the 
Union has frequently preferred immediate stability in the south, and thus authoritarian 
                                                          
55 The funding will be provided through the following sources: ‚private sector participation; 
contributions from the EU budget and all partners; contributions from other countries, interna-
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rule and repression, to slow and possibly messy regime transformation‛56 On the other 
side, and besides this mainstream EU criticism, however, it is possible to demonstrate 
that the development of the ENP and the UfM can be interpreted and analyzed as a 
foreign policy regime, adding new dimensions to the discussions about the specific 
character of EU ‚actorness‛ and the role of the EU in international politics. 
The EU owes its recent status to its own history and one of the first attempts at 
launching a foreign policy related to the Middle East was in 1980 with the Venice-
declaration. As described in this sense it can be understood as something of a land-
mark, even though the aspirations expressed were never fulfilled. Fifteen years later, in 
1995, the EMP programme was established, with a regionalist perspective and norma-
tive EU ambitions. Israel and the Palestinian Authorities were part of the EMP, and an 
important part of the reason for the launching of the programme had to do with the 
optimism attached to the Peace Process following the Declaration of Principles of Sep-
tember 1993. With the ENP the focus became bilateral and as mentioned the initial in-
tentions of creating a ‚Ring of Friends‛ based on the principle of positive condition-
ality soon changed into pragmatic policies, which not necessarily were very different 
and signalled moderate ambitions. And with the UfM (and the subsequent renaming of 
the EMP) a new policy is created, the substance of which is depoliticization and prag-
matism. The combination of the ENP and the UfM can be perceived as a foreign policy 
regime on behalf of the EU. As shown it can be concluded that from the ENP to the 
UfM there is not only continuity in the real practices – there is more or less an identity 
when it comes to the actual implementation of the policies. 
The actual unfolding of the ENP and the building of the UfM demonstrates the 
usefulness of the regime perspective. With the two policies a pragmatic foreign policy 
building is being constructed, which might serve its purpose but at the same time 
maintains the impression in the Middle East of the EU as an inefficient and primarily 
economic actor. The comparison and analysis of the policies towards Israel and Pales-
tine show the pragmatism of the EU and underlines that over the last 5 years a depoli-
ticization more and more characterizes EU policies towards the Mediterranean. The 
case of Israel and the PA is thus a paradigmatic case, yet at the same time different 
from other cases in the sense that the Israel-PA conflict has had important conse-
quences for the lack of development in the institutional and political dimensions of the 
UfM. The UfM was launched in July 2008. Only a few months later, in December 2008 
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and January 2009, the Gaza war resulted in a deterioration of relations between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians, which had direct effect on planned meetings within the 
organizational framework of the UfM.  
The general situation in the occupied territories contributed to the worsening of 
relations. The construction of new settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank led 
to internal split in Palestinian leadership concerning the negotiations with the Israelis. 
The bitter political divide between Hamas and Fatah might be the most important, but 
the fact that PFLP recently suspended its membership of the PLO in protest at the 
peace talks, further highlights the problematic situation.57 The EU did very little to in-
fluence the difficult situation, but continued to rely on the efforts by the Quartet as the 
relevant forum for dialogue with the parties. In a statement in September 2010 the 
Quartet noted that ‚the commendable Israeli settlement moratorium instituted last 
November has had a positive impact and urged its continuation.‛58 A few months be-
fore that Javier Solana made a speech, in which he suggested that ‚a UN Security 
Council resolution should proclaim the adoption of the two state solution. This should 
include all the parameters of borders, refugees, Jerusalem and security arrangements. It 
would accept the Palestinian state as a full member of the UN, and set a calendar for 
implementation.‛ As Marian Houk correctly notes, this speech, which almost brings 
the Venice Declaration into memory, came as something of a surprise, but was not suc-
ceeded by further EU action.59 The EU ENP and UfM regime does not seek to influence 
the Mediterranean reality. Rather the ‚pragmatic cosmopolitan‛, as coined by Richard 
Youngs as ‚brand-name‛ for the Europeans on the international political scene60, 
chooses pragmatism and depoliticization as the principal ideas in its efforts related to 
the Israel-PA conflict and to the Middle East in general. 
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